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Reducing energy demand has become a key mechanism for limiting climate change, 7 
but practical limitations associated with large energy savings in a growing global 8 
economy and, importantly, its lower-income parts remain. Using new energy-GDP data, 9 
we show that adopting the same near-term low-energy growth trajectory in all regions 10 
in IPCC scenarios limiting global warming to 1.5°C presents an unresolved policy 11 
challenge. We discuss this challenge of combining energy demand reductions with 12 
robust income growth for the 6.4 billion people in middle and low income countries in 13 
light of economic development’s reliance on industrialisation. Our results highlight the 14 
importance of addressing limits to energy demand reduction in integrated assessment 15 
modelling when regional economic development is powered by industrialisation and 16 
instead exploring faster energy supply decarbonisation. Insights from development 17 
economics and other disciplines could help generate plausible assumptions given the 18 
financial, investment and stability issues involved. 19 
20 
Limiting global warming to 2°C or even 1.5°C requires carbon emissions from energy to reach 21 
net zero by around mid-century1. Reducing energy demand is considered a key mechanism 22 
for emissions reduction and alleviates the burden on the two other principal measures: 23 
decarbonisation of the energy supply, and carbon dioxide removal (CDR)2. However, energy 24 
is key for the economy. The implications for global and regional economic growth of reducing 25 
energy demand are insufficiently explored but central in integrated assessment models 26 
(IAMs). 27 
28 
Scenarios from IAMs synthesized in the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C 29 
assume that absolute decoupling (i.e. reducing energy consumption while growing GDP) is 30 
both readily feasible and inexpensive3. The report presents 90 scenarios limiting the 31 
temperature increase to 1.5°C by 2100. In the near term, all continue or exceed historically 32 
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observed GDP growth rates. However, the scenarios assume declining primary energy (PE) 33 
demand in contrast to historical patterns, with median global PE demand falling by 13.6% 34 
between 2020 and 2030 to a rate of 507.5EJ/yr or 16.1TW, below the level of 2010. Some of 35 
this reduction is achieved by shifting from fossil to more efficient renewable energy sources. 36 
The resulting decarbonisation would be insufficient for meeting the 1.5°C constraint, so 37 
scenarios also require final energy (FE) demand to fall by a median 8.0% over the same 38 
period. Once decarbonisation is sufficiently advanced and/or CDR technologies become cost-39 
competitive after 2040, energy demand is projected to return to its historical growth trend. 40 
These patterns are less pronounced, but qualitatively similar, in scenarios limiting temperature 41 
rise to 2°C. 42 
 43 
How plausible are these near-term projections? Economic growth-energy trajectories of rich, 44 
de-industrialising countries can be argued to decouple, at least from territorial energy 45 
demand4. But a large majority (84%) of the global population currently lives in low and middle 46 
income countries which are still set on a development path paved by industrialisation. Using 47 
a new global dataset on national output-energy relationships from 1950 to the present, we 48 
discuss why decoupling trends contained in the current scenarios are hard to justify for 49 
robustly growing developing countries and explore how the underlying models’ explanatory 50 
power could be improved. Focusing on the extreme case of the (relatively low-income) Middle 51 
East and Africa region, we illustrate that scenario assumptions about decoupling, catching-52 
up, and energy demand (e.g. that per capita FE demand is projected to fall, often below levels 53 
deemed critical for decent living standards, while income growth accelerates) imply a near-54 
term mitigation capacity qualitatively similar to that of rich countries and a development path 55 
at odds with historical data and insights from development economics. While large efficiency 56 
improvements are thermodynamically possible, achieving the projected absolute decoupling 57 
alongside successful industrialisation presents an unresolved policy challenge. Growth 58 
strategies, financing of investments in capital constrained developing countries, means of 59 
technology transfer, and macroeconomic policy could facilitate both. Spelling them out 60 
explicitly could clarify lower limits on energy demand in growing economies and help uncover 61 
opportunities for modelling faster energy supply decarbonisation. 62 
 63 
Economic Activity and Energy Demand 64 
The dependence of economic output on energy can be expressed by decomposing GDP per 65 
capita (or labour productivity), Y/P, often seen as a measure of affluence, into energy per 66 
capita, E/P, and the inverse of energy intensity or energy ‘productivity’ of output in economists’ 67 












This is an economically-inspired decomposition5 related to the widely used Kaya identity.6 70 
Labour productivity growth requires either a decline in energy intensity (higher average energy 71 
productivity) or more energy per worker. Because energy enters the economy as primary 72 
energy (PE) and becomes final energy (FE) before acting directly on producing value as useful 73 
















where first law conversion efficiencies determine how much PE input is needed for a given 76 
useful energy output. Exergy or second law efficiency imposes upper bounds on these 77 
conversion ratios and thus a lower bound on energy intensity at every level. 78 
 79 
Reducing energy demand is different from decarbonising its supply: there is no particular 80 
reason why the economy cannot run on a 100% decarbonised energy mix. However, 81 
thermodynamics explains why a minimum of energy must be involved in all productive human 82 
activity. Primary to final energy conversion efficiencies can be vastly improved when 83 
decarbonising the energy supply, and its magnitude is partly an accounting question.7 The 84 
pivot is the final to useful conversion efficiency, for which large theoretical and also significant 85 
technical potentials for improvement exist.8,9 The pertinent obstacles in a socio-economic 86 
context however are economic and behavioural, i.e. practical, limits to the rate at which 87 
efficiency improvements can be implemented in growing and developing economies, whose 88 
primary aim is to raise labour productivity and income per capita, not to improve energy 89 
efficiency. 90 
 91 
Historical trends 92 
The relationship between economic activity and energy demand has been widely analysed 93 
(see supplementary note 1). Historically, primary to final and useful conversion efficiencies 94 
have improved, but slowly. The useful energy to output ratio has no time trend10. Therefore, 95 
most labour productivity growth over the past three centuries translated into higher PE 96 
demand11–14. Since the Industrial Revolution humans unlocked the energy stored in fossil fuels 97 
and power increasing amounts of useful labour human workers perform15,16. Labour 98 
productivity rose twentyfold between 1820 and the end of the millennium in Europe and its 99 
Western offshoots17. Most other countries have since embarked on the same process of 100 
energy-intensive technical change, aspiring to similar increases in labour productivity and the 101 
resulting standards of living. Economic historians mostly track correlations in GDP and primary 102 
energy per capita16, although recent work tentatively confirms similar patterns for final and 103 




[Figure 1 about here] 106 
 107 
The relationship between energy demand and labour productivity is clearly visible in historical 108 
data. Figure 1a depicts annual time series for 185 countries over a period 1950-2014, 109 
comprising ~99% of global population in most years, on a log-log scale. It reveals a very tight 110 
correlation between GDP per capita and PE per capita, with a Spearman rank correlation 111 
coefficient of 0.86 for the overall sample. While country-specific differences exist due to 112 
geography, climate, institutions, idiosyncratic production and consumption patterns etc., 113 
pooled data show that increases in GDP/capita go in hand with increases in PE/capita, both 114 
across countries and time. A flexible regression gives a nearly linear fit in the log-log plot over 115 
the interval relevant to today’s developing countries. The estimated GDP elasticity of primary 116 
energy, i.e. the logarithmic derivative of primary energy divided by that of GDP, is 0.89 over 117 
the interval of USD 2,000 to USD 20,000 in 2011 purchasing power parity (a country belongs 118 
to the high-income group from a GDP of around USD 12,500 per capita). In other words, a 119 
10% increase in GDP/capita corresponds to a 8.9% increase in PE/capita (see Methods), with 120 
the difference capturing the gradual reductions of primary energy intensity, PE/GDP, over 121 
time20. The regression line flattens at very low levels suggesting a minimum level of energy 122 
use even when large parts of the economy operate in non-market subsistence activities or 123 
during (civil) war, e.g. the leftmost observations in the plot capture Liberia’s first civil war. Data 124 
points above USD 130,000 are small oil exporting countries, introducing strong idiosyncrasies 125 
to the regression at such income levels. Our findings are robust to relevant subsamples (e.g. 126 
only large economies, the G20) and to alternative measures of GDP and population (extended 127 
data figure 1, see also supplementary note 2). 128 
 129 
Globally, labour productivity and per capita energy demand have been growing over the 130 
complete sample, except for periods of crisis. Figure 1b divides global rates of change of GDP 131 
and PE/capita into three subperiods, corresponding to economic growth performance. The 132 
fastest global labour productivity growth on record occurred during 1950-73, known as the 133 
Golden Age of Capitalism (Gold)17. Rapid economic expansion was underpinned by an almost 134 
equally rapid growth in energy demand in particular for cheap oil and electricity; and rural 135 
electrification in many developing countries started virtually from scratch21,22. The Golden Age 136 
was followed by a period of crises and slow growth for the rest of the 20th century (Slow).17 137 
Sluggish GDP growth during the 1973 and 1978-9 oil crises preceded the deepest recession 138 
in 1981 the world had seen since the Great Depression. Deindustrialisation and productivity 139 
slowdown in rich countries combined with the transitions of formerly socialist economies, 140 
several of whom went through severe depressions, kept average growth rates lower 141 
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throughout the 1980s-90s23. Higher energy prices and supply curtailment set in train energy 142 
demand restraint and efficiency-increasing technological change in rich countries. Meanwhile, 143 
the economic collapse of the Soviet Union forced a revision of its comparatively low efficiency 144 
energy sector and production processes24. China’s fast machinery upgrading combined with 145 
a shift towards light industry in the 1980s-90s, temporarily slowed its energy demand growth 146 
relative to that of GDP25. These one-time shifts produced an almost stagnant PE/capita 147 
trajectory. After the millennium, growth in both measures rebounded, driven increasingly by 148 
China’s return to more energy intensive production, but also ‘emerging markets’ more 149 
generally. Fast growth in both indicators was interrupted by the Great Recession 2008-09. 150 
Growth rates subsequently returned to pre-millennium levels. Overall, faster growth in one 151 
indicator was positively correlated with faster growth in the other, and PE demand growth was 152 
a good proxy also for that of FE (extended data figure 2). And while energy demand in rich 153 
countries has been stagnating and even falling, growth is continuing robustly in middle and 154 
low income countries (figure 1c). 155 
 156 
Future Scenarios 157 
Stringent mitigation policy strives to break (some of) these historical trends. Scenarios of the 158 
IPCC special report calculate that in order to achieve the 1.5°C goal, a structural break from 159 
historical total energy-income relationships is needed in the coming twenty years. To characterize 160 
this break, figure 2a combines future projections of GDP and FE/capita with aggregated 161 
historical data from figure 1. The historical trend (black in figure 2a) is upwards and rightwards. 162 
Extrapolations based on the three historical periods (red in figure 2a) continue in this direction: 163 
faster economic growth in the Gold and Millennium periods (further right) is associated with 164 
faster increases in energy demand (further up). In contrast, scenario pathways combine robust 165 
growth in GDP/capita with an unprecedented sustained reduction in FE/capita, particularly in 166 
the 2020s and 2030s. Qualitatively similar results hold for PE and for scenarios limiting 167 
warming to 2°C (extended data figure 3).  168 
 169 
[Figure 2 about here] 170 
 171 
Four scenario pathways (blue in figure 2a), highlighted as so-called archetype scenarios in 172 
the IPCC special report, are based on the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP) 1, 2, and 5 173 
and a ‘low energy demand’ (LED) scenario, which is also based on SSP2. Significant near-174 
term FE/capita reductions occur in all of them except SSP5, which assumes that current 175 
carbon-intensive development is adopted globally and projects faster GDP/capita growth than 176 
seen even during the Golden Age. Since other mitigation avenues are assumed to be 177 
unavailable and/or exhausted, CDR is cost-effectively deployed to meet meaningful climate 178 
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targets in SSP526. In SSP2 past technological, economic and social dynamics are extrapolated 179 
and CDR is less cost-effective27. As a result, energy demand has to fall to meet the 1.5°C 180 
target, with rates of energy intensity reductions surpassing previous records set in the 1980s-181 
90s. GDP/capita growth is robust, similar to the Millennium period average. The SSP1 “green 182 
growth” scenario is optimistic by design and, therefore, least consistent with historical trends, 183 
combining historically unobserved high GDP/capita growth rates with a 17% reduction in 184 
FE/capita from 2020 to 203028. The LED is a Goldilocks scenario with the same baseline as 185 
SSP2, but with efficiency improvements and demand reductions due to consumer habits 186 
following best practice in both the global South and North29. FE/capita falls by 32% from 2020 187 
to 2030. This ensemble of scenarios unmistakably illustrates the clean break with past energy 188 
drivers of economic growth underlying the 1.5°C and also 2°C targets. 189 
 190 
This structural break extends to the regional level and is particularly striking for regions with 191 
lower labour productivity, represented by the Middle East and Africa (MAF) region in figure 2b. 192 
In this region, median GDP/capita growth and year across scenarios runs at healthy 2.5% 193 
during 2020-2050, compared with stagnating 0.1% during 1973-2000 and meagre 1.4% during 194 
2000-18. Since 1950, FE/capita has increased continuously in the MAF region, from less than 195 
0.4kW/capita to around 1kW/capita. This is low compared to the global average of 196 
1.75kW/capita and lower still in some African countries, as the MAF average masks the large 197 
variation between Middle Eastern oil exporters and sub-Saharan agrarian economies. 198 
However, rather than converging toward the world average and in spite of the evidence that, 199 
especially at these low levels, development (including GDP growth) and energy are 200 
particularly strongly correlated, almost all scenarios project steep declines in FE demand for 201 
the MAF region30. A majority of scenarios even move significantly below the 0.95kW/cap 202 
(30GJ/yr/cap) FE identified as tantamount to low levels of development in the SSP literature 203 
itself31. The most extreme case sees a 56% reduction from 2020 to 2030 to a rate of below 204 
0.5kW/cap (supplementary note 3 details). Similar patterns are projected in Asia and to a 205 
lesser extent Latin America (extended data figure 4 and supplementary note 4). Put differently, 206 
the scenarios rely heavily on final to useful energy efficiency improvements to provide energy 207 
services for development. 208 
 209 
[Figure 3 about here] 210 
 211 
Mitigation strategies can also be characterized by comparing scenarios with their own 212 
baselines in addition to historical evidence32. Figure 3a documents the near-term deviation of 213 
growth rates in both baseline and policy scenarios from historical rates. Global archetype 214 
baselines (marked by disks) assume faster GDP/capita growth than historically observed in 215 
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the period to 2030, correlated with faster FE/capita growth in all but the SSP1 baseline. The 216 
MAF region is the only region where every archetype scenario baseline assumes FE/capita 217 
growth to slow down and economic growth to accelerate, thereby assuming some decoupling 218 
already in the baseline. Remarkably, near-term GDP/capita growth accelerates in every single 219 
global baseline of successful mitigation scenarios (extended data figure 5). Regions see more 220 
variation. A few regional baselines exclusively in Asia and the OECD feature lower economic 221 
growth rates, with Asia slowing from fast historical ones. Regional baseline FE/capita often 222 
correlates positively with faster economic growth, but sometimes slows already like in the MAF 223 
archetypes. In sum, baselines project near-term economic development highly successful by 224 
historical standards, often but not always correlated with faster global energy demand growth. 225 
Several regions are assumed to decouple already in the baseline.  226 
 227 
Mitigation is assumed to leave economic growth rates virtually unchanged from baselines 228 
while energy demand plummets. Deviations from baselines are an order of magnitude larger 229 
for final energy than GDP (figure 3b). This is independent of whether GDP is exogenous or 230 
endogenous in the IAM used (extended data figure 6a). The MAF region exhibits the same 231 
flexibility for energy demand reductions from baselines as other regions, despite its much 232 
lower base level and in addition to the substantial savings already assumed in its baseline 233 
scenarios. After 2040 growth rates approach their historical averages across all scenarios. As 234 
decarbonisation advances and/or CDR measures come online, energy demand becomes a 235 
lesser constraint on emissions. These effects are qualitatively similar but less pronounced in 236 
scenarios limiting warming to below 2°C (extended data figures 5, 6b). In sum, scenarios are 237 
optimistic in two ways: baselines exhibit an acceleration of income growth, then mitigation 238 
assumes a decoupling between energy demand and income. How can this optimism be 239 
motivated? 240 
 241 
Problems with regional absolute decoupling 242 
While models behind the scenarios discussed above vary in their details about future trends, 243 
they share the same theoretical approach to economy-energy modelling. Responses to 244 
carbon prices are assumed to be efficient, smooth, and in principle arbitrarily large. Except for 245 
differences in parameter values, high-, middle- and low-income economies are assumed to 246 
follow the same model. Supplementary note 5 critically discusses the economic growth theory 247 
behind IAMs. 248 
 249 
Development economics tells a cautionary tale about assuming efficient growth without 250 
explaining how it is achieved. The simple idea of “getting the prices right”, by imposing high 251 
corrective carbon prices or equivalent policies, must contend with two centuries of economic 252 
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history. Achieving sustained and fast economic growth from low levels has been far from the 253 
norm since the 1950s, and where it has been achieved it was by industrialisation. Industrial 254 
production requires higher commercial energy inputs per worker than either (subsistence) 255 
farming or services, and industrialisation has historically tended to imply rising, not falling, 256 
commercial energy intensity33–35. Yet, in order to realise the robust growth rates projected for 257 
the less affluent regions and the world as a whole, some form of industrialisation has to take 258 
place. Achieving this industrialisation is difficult. Simultaneously maximising energy 259 
conversion efficiency as emphasized in the scenarios above poses an unresolved policy 260 
challenge. 261 
 262 
In order to industrialize and adopt ‘frontier’ technology, developing countries have to import 263 
capital goods from rich country producers. This is especially true for the kind of energy-saving 264 
industrialisation envisioned by the IPCC scenarios. Industrialising countries face what are 265 
known as ‘two gap’ problems in development economics. The domestic lack of savings 266 
hinders investments (gap 1), and excessive trade deficits – e.g. from the need to import high 267 
efficiency capital goods – makes these investments even more expensive (gap 2)36. To get 268 
around this financing dilemma, less efficient but cheaper and possibly domestically produced 269 
machines could be installed. This would however ‘lock in’ the lower level of efficiency for the 270 
machines’ lifetimes37. Case studies of tapping vast energy efficiency potentials tend to 271 
describe situations where financing is not a constraint38, and how quickly or whether efficiency 272 
improvements pay for themselves is context-dependent39. 273 
 274 
The capital constraint is accentuated when recognising the limited domestic resources 275 
available in most countries40. Incomes reported in purchasing power parity (PPP) inflate lower 276 
income countries’ resources to reflect relatively cheap domestic purchases. However, to the 277 
extent that energy efficient products must be purchased internationally, market exchange 278 
rates count. In 2018 - and low-income countries had only 42% the income in terms of US 279 
dollars at market exchange rates compared to PPP (USD4,967 vs. USD11,769 per capita). 280 
Borrowing internationally and in foreign currency to finance these investments is risky and 281 
costly, as a predominance of international finance can have destabilising effects.41,42 Shrewd 282 
macroeconomic policy in developing countries could help with improving economic conditions 283 
and enabling the financing. It must also stabilise economies that are disrupted by high carbon 284 
prices. 285 
 286 
Abrupt and unanticipated changes in prices (energy or otherwise) have caused recessions 287 
with high unemployment by upending the original production structure based on a different set 288 
of prices. The aftermath of the 1978-79 oil crisis is one example of this. It also helped cause 289 
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debt defaults in Latin American countries when their foreign debts denominated in dollars 290 
became more expensive in the wake of the US’ hike in interest rates (Volcker shock) to deal 291 
with US price changes. Additionally, disruptions from price-focussed climate policy could 292 
cause asset stranding, default on debts, and a destabilisation of the financial system via these 293 
‘transition risks’, another area that needs a macroeconomic policy response43,44. IAMs, 294 
originally designed for long-term analysis, assume smooth paths of adjustment given any 295 
price. Yet, as the short-term assumes crucial importance for ambitious mitigation, the question 296 
of how financing and macroeconomic stability in developing countries constrains model 297 
pathways requires scrutiny and insights from short-term (development) macroeconomics 298 
could inform assumptions about feasible industrial and stabilization policy45,46. 299 
 300 
Research Directions 301 
Economists have historically tended to be more bullish than other disciplines about the 302 
economy’s ability to overcome resource constraints via substitution47,48. Yet, the smooth 303 
substitution in developing countries of vastly more energy efficient technologies over the next 304 
couple of decades alongside successful development implied by current climate policy 305 
scenarios in IAMs is challenging also by these standards. None of this even addresses 306 
rebound effects, which are poorly understood at the macroeconomic level but could be 307 
substantial49, additional consumption at the extensive margin, such as first-time purchase of 308 
white goods50, or increased air-conditioning in a warming climate51. Historical evidence and 309 
development economics strongly suggest saving energy cannot play the role it is currently 310 
assigned in scenarios. 311 
 312 
IAMs were designed to produce consistent long-run projections of the climate and the 313 
economy. With climate change accelerating and policy lagging behind, model scenarios are 314 
push the limits of feasibility in multiple domains to achieve stringent mitigation targets. Hence, 315 
such scenarios have to be interpreted as conditional explorations. However, we argue that 316 
various IAM scenarios ignore important institutional constraints, which we believe to be 317 
binding due to historical evidence. Since IAMs cannot test their results against data that is not 318 
yet generated, they must convince with strong explanatory power that their pathways are 319 
plausible32,52. Our analysis of the development of energy demand alongside robust economic 320 
growth across regions suggests that the details of near-term “development without energy” 321 
need to be better understood for making plausible assumptions.53  322 
 323 
Key details would involve clarifying developing country growth strategies (particularly 324 
industrialisation) and their energy implications, as well as problems of financing and 325 
stabilization in the short-term. Taking industrialisation as a growth strategy seriously may 326 
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challenge some of the assumptions about low energy growth as we argued here. But more 327 
attention to explicit modelling of investment and its financing may loosen other constraints. 328 
While daunting challenges also exist in decarbonising developing countries’ energy mix,40  329 
robust investment-price decline relationships could highlight opportunities for faster energy 330 
supply decarbonisation54, where IAMs have been shown to depict slow rates of change relative 331 
to historical figures55–57.  332 
 333 
First attempts to quantify global investments within IAMs46 and independent studies41,58,59 are 334 
promising, and financing and risks to stability are also starting to be considered60. Research 335 
on the political feasibility of such investments and potential trade-offs between different 336 
mitigation policies has not yet produced robust evidence, but suggests that barriers may 337 
exist61,62. With their rapid break from past patterns of growth in economic output and energy 338 
inputs, the scenarios show just how difficult the challenge for a concerted policy effort is to 339 
simultaneously sustain economic growth, redirect investments towards low-carbon 340 
alternatives, improve policy cooperation and prevent rebound effects with price policies that 341 
must nonetheless not be regressive. Detailing the process by which this happens would make 342 
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Historical Country Data 495 
The historical analysis builds on a newly compiled dataset for annual national total primary 496 
energy supply from 1950 to 2014 with nearly global coverage of 186 countries. Total primary 497 
energy supply from the International Energy Agency Energy Balances63 (starting in 1960 for 498 
most OECD countries, and 1971 or later for other countries) was combined with Energy 499 
Balances constructed from the United Nations Energy Statistics64 that start in 1950. IEA data 500 
was converted to direct equivalent accounting for compatibility with UN data and IPCC 501 
scenarios, all of which use that accounting method. Where both datasets were available, IEA 502 
data was used; however, besides wide coverage back to 1950, the UN data covers several 503 
countries not included in the IEA data. Databases were spliced and adjusted to the IEA level 504 
if necessary. To address the problem of missing non-commercial energy data (most often 505 
reported only from 1970 by the UN), non-commercial energy demand in most areas of the 506 
world in 1949 was taken from a unique 1952 study by the UN65. The share of non-commercial 507 
energy in the mix in 1949 and 1970 or the earliest available year was calculated and the share 508 
in each year in the interval interpolated. Then total primary energy supply was calculated by 509 
adding the non-commercial energy demand implied by the interpolated share to the known 510 
commercial energy supply. GDP and population are from the Penn World Table66 and, where 511 
unavailable, from the Maddison Project67. Supplementary figure 1 shows the resulting 512 
population and country coverage. The 1950s cover upwards of 91% of population, and this 513 
coverage reaches almost 98% in the 1960s and stays above 99% from 1971 onwards. 514 
Between 1969 and 1971 many additional countries report data, but most of the 1990 additions 515 
are due to accounting switching from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to altogether 20 516 
successor states. Detail about the dataset construction, in particular the construction of non-517 
commercial energy time series and treatment of dissolving or unifying countries is in the 518 
accompanying data article68. 519 
Historical Regional Data 520 
Historical world and regional primary and final energy, GDP and population data are from the 521 
IEA Energy Balances and Indicators from 1971 through 2017. Countries were assigned to 522 
regions according to the IPCC’s R5 definition69. Data for the world for 2018 are from IEA’s 523 
2019 World Energy Outlook70 and the World Bank Open Data. Primary energy was converted 524 
to direct equivalent accounting for comparability with IPCC scenarios. For 1950-1970 regional 525 
data and global energy data is from the PFU database19, global population data is from the 526 
UN, GDP data for 1960-1971 is from the World Bank and for 1950-1960 from the Maddison 527 





Historical Correlation and Regression Analysis 531 
The correlation coefficient calculated for historical data is Spearman’s rank-based 532 
coefficient. Figure 1 in the main text displays a local polynomial regression, loess, which 533 
does not impose a particular parametric global model, but estimates a fit based on segments 534 
of the data using a quadratic polynomial. For each observation j=1,…n, we estimate an 535 
equation system of 𝑘 = 0.8 × 𝑛 dimensions 536 
𝐸!
𝑃!








+ 𝜀! ,					𝑓𝑜𝑟		𝑖 = 1,…𝑘 537 
using least squares, and including observation j and its argument’s k-1 nearest neighbours, 538 
that are weighted in the least squares calculation using the tricubic function 𝑤 = (1 − |𝑑|$)$ 539 
and where d is a metric distance between observation j and its neighbours. This gives n fits. 540 




	 of the ith fit. Loess is introduced 541 
in Cleveland71 and for computation we use the R language implementation loess()72. The 542 
extended data fit to G20 countries uses a polynomial of degree one to account for the lower 543 
number of observations. 544 
 545 
An elasticity of y with respect to x, 𝜂(,*, is defined as the percent change in y for a one 546 
percent change in x or the ratio of the logarithmic derivatives, 𝜂(,* =
+ ,-.(
+ ,-. *
. We approximate 547 
elasticities of primary energy per capita with respect to output per capita by taking two 548 
arguments and their respective predicted values from the local polynomial regression and 549 




















IPCC scenario data and analysis 556 
Data for the scenarios of the future pathways were downloaded on October 19, 2019 from 557 
the database behind the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, version 558 
iamc15_scenario_data_all_regions_r2.073. The database was supplemented first with 559 
baselines for the ‘PEP’ suite of scenarios45 calculated with REMIND-MAgPIE 1.7-3.0, which 560 
are not included in the special report dataset. The PEP modelling team kindly shared the 561 
PEP baseline data upon request. Second, the database was supplemented with regional 562 
data for the Low Energy Demand (LED) scenario29, which were not yet available at the time 563 
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of the 1.5°C Warming IPCC report from 2018, and have been kindly made available by the 564 
LED modelling team upon request. In the resulting dataset, 90 scenarios achieve 1.5°C 565 
average global warming above preindustrial levels by 2100 with a 50% chance. Scenarios 566 
are further subdivided by their probability of temporarily overshooting this temperature during 567 
the 21st century. 9 scenarios have a 50-66% chance not to overshoot in the 21st century; 44 568 
scenarios overshoot with a 50-67% (low) chance; the remainder have a high probability 569 
greater than 67% of overshoot3. Not all scenarios report both GDP and primary and final 570 
energy. None of the five C-ROADS-5.005 scenarios report primary and final energy figures. 571 
The only MERGE ETL 6.0 scenario and four REMIND 1.5 scenarios do not report GDP. This 572 
leaves 80 scenarios, based on 7 models (which can have several versions), as depicted in 573 
the supplementary table 1, with more than half of all scenarios supplied by two models. 79 574 
scenarios report data on all indicators for MAF and REF regions, and ten of these, all from 575 
the POLES model in the scenario family EMF33 do not report data for other regions, leaving 576 
69 models with full regional coverage. The table also shows how GDP is calculated. For 577 
further information see the IPCC report’s supplementary material, which also states the 578 
historical period that the report used for validation of energy-GDP trajectories to be 1971-579 
201574. This period can differ from the periods used when individual scenarios were 580 
published. E.g. the MESSAGE SSP2 archetype uses 1970-201027 and the SSP energy 581 
sector overview considers 1980-201031. 582 
The database also contains 119 scenarios limiting warming to 2°C and 185 scenarios, 583 
including but not limited to baseline scenarios where global warming is above 2°C in 2100. 584 
To these correspond 109 and 179 scenarios with at least some regional details. These 585 
scenarios form the ensemble of the scenarios investigated here. 586 
To compare historical levels with those in the scenarios in the main text’s figure 2, all 587 
scenarios were adjusted so that the GDP and energy per capita levels in 2010 were equal to 588 
those of the historical data. Where actual energy demand levels are mentioned in the text, 589 
these are taken from the original scenario data, not from the adjusted series. 590 
 591 
Data availability 592 
The data that support the national and regional historical energy series are from the United 593 
Nations (UN) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) but restrictions apply to the 594 
availability of these data, which were used under licence for the current study, and so are 595 
not publicly available. National historical data are however deposited with the UK Data 596 
Service68 with access conditional on case-by-case permission by the IEA: 597 
https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/get-data.aspx. All other historical data is publicly available 598 
from the Penn World Table, Maddison Project, the World Bank and the PFU database. The 599 
data that support the future scenarios are derived exclusively from the IAMC 1.5°C Scenario 600 
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Explorer and Data and are available for free at: https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/iamc-1.5c-601 
explorer/. 602 
 603 
Code availability. 604 
The code for curating the future scenario data once downloaded and for generating all the 605 
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Figure 1 | Historical output and energy per capita relation: (a) Annual GDP per capita in 639 
2011 kiloUSD at purchasing power parity (PPP) and direct equivalent primary energy 640 
including non-commercial sources per capita in kilowatt for 185 countries 1950-2014 641 
(unbalanced). Every colour represents a country time series. The black line is a loess fit with 642 
the blue lines 1.96 standard deviations. (b) Global annual and average growth rates during 643 
three historical periods. (c) Rate of energy flow in countries grouped by GDP/capita, 1950-644 
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Figure 2 | Projections of output and final energy per capita relation until 2050: (a) 651 
Global income per capita and final energy per capita projections of 1.5°C scenarios to 2050 652 
in grey. Archetype scenarios are in blue, others in grey. Scenario values have been 653 
normalised to start at the same historical level in 2010. Markers indicate decades. The 654 
historical trajectory is in black and the red lines extrapolate 1950-73 (Gold), 1973-2000 655 
(Slow) and 2000-18 (Millennium) growth rates. The Gold extrapolation is truncated after 656 
2030 to avoid extending the y-axis. (b) Same as (a) but for Middle East & Africa region. 657 
Sources: see methods. 658 
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Figure 3 | Baseline and policy scenario growth rate deviations from historical rates: 662 
(a) Growth rate deviation in percentage points in scenarios in 2020-30 relative to the 1970-663 
2015 historical average for the World and Middle East & Africa in baselines (BAU) and 664 
successive mitigation scenarios, 2°C and 1.5°C of the four SSP ‘archetype’ scenarios. 665 
GDP/capita deviation is on the x-axis, FE/capita is on the y-axis. (b) Deviations in 666 
percentage points from BAU growth rates in all scenarios mitigating to 1.5°C in three periods 667 
for the World and Middle East & Africa. Boxes encompass the interquartile range with a 668 
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